

SLV

*How Organization reports**Central Committee ?*

FILE	SUBJ.
DATE	SUB-CAT.
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NLF C.C. INTERZONE ASSESSMENT: FEBRUARY 1970

I. SITUATION OF THE ENEMY AND OUR GOVERNMENT
AND PRESENT AND FUTURE GOVERNMENTAL
ACTIVITIES.

a. In the face of increasingly heavy defeats, the U.S. and the Puppet Government [RVN] have tried to carry out their accelerated pacification plan by organizing the puppet local administrative machinery, inter-family groups, hamlets, ward systems, rural pacification groups, Civilian Self-Defense units and reactionary political parties to gain control of the people, encroach upon the land and compete with us for a stronger position. However, during the past period our Sub-Region has established the Sub-Region People's Revolutionary Committee and other similar committees in three districts, 1 province capital, 1 district seat and in 27 villages. We have also established 9 People's Councils. These successes have deeply influenced the Puppet Government and troops and promoted the people's revolutionary prestige. However, these are only our initial achievements for we still have a number of the following shortcomings which must be immediately overcome:

- Though having been established, our committees have not become systematic and operated in accordance with their governmental functions.

- The working procedures of these committees are still awkward, performed superficially in the Party guidelines and our cadres are still in confusion.

- Civilian organizations have not become hard-core and effective supports of the governmental activities.

The main reason for the above shortcomings stems from the Party's various echelons having not thoroughly understood the significance and requirements of our task in establishing a revolutionary government in the present time and in the future.

b. Requirements and the task of establishing a Sub-Region government for the coming days:

Develop our past achievements by intensifying the

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three-pronged attacks, continuing to frustrate the enemy's accelerated pacification plan in the three areas [mountains, lowlands and towns]. At the same time we have to establish and consolidate our revolutionary administrative machinery everywhere to gain the control for the people.

II. OUR TASKS.

A. Organizations, working procedures, governmental activities at all echelons in all areas:

1. In Đức Huệ area:

Đức Huệ is a base in the border area with favorable conditions, therefore we must organize it into an effective governmental system from district to village and hamlet level as prescribed by 5 Truong [possibly COSVN].

- Immediately reorganize and consolidate district and village committees and all hamlet administrative sections.

- The Committees and specialized branches of the district, village and hamlet should perform their roles and carry out their capabilities and missions properly as prescribed.

- Assign Party and Group members to be responsible for the Party Committees and for carrying out completely the Party resolution in governmental activities.

Our specific missions are to intensify the education task, promote political awareness of the people to successfully mobilize manpower and material resources for the frontline. Immediately we must mobilize recruits, civilian laborers and financial support. We should also heighten the people's solidarity in production, increase the annihilation of the enemy along with developing public health, cultural and educational activities and create favorable conditions to relocate the people in cleared zones for production. We must be determined to suppress the counter-reactionaries and bad elements that disturb social order and security as well as carrying out successfully our border policy. We must also ensure democracy for the people by permanently reporting the government activities to the people for criticism and contributions from the people.

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- Specialized branches should perform expertly their professional tasks to help the People's Revolutionary Committees in leadership.

2. In intermediate areas: (Đức Hòa, Bến Thu) consolidate organizations; step up our activities; observe operational guidelines.

a. Each People's Revolutionary Committee in districts, province capitals and district seats must be made up of three members, and assign one cadre to take charge of guiding its People's Revolutionary Committee, [sic] studying the governmental activities and cooperating with the District Committee to provide guidance for Party Chapters. This cadre must also help a number of village People's Revolutionary Committees perform the governmental activities in villages such as Tân Phú, Tân Mỹ, An Ninh, Đức Lập Thượng, Đức Lập Hạ (Higher and lower Đức Lập), (Đức Hòa), Thanh Hà, An Thành, Tân Bưu, Mỹ An Phú (Bến Thu).

- Each village People's Revolutionary Committee must be made up of three to five members, and assign one cadre and a number of Party and Group members to be responsible to the Party Chapter in carrying out the governmental activities.

- In villages not having favorable conditions for organizing the Revolutionary Government, a Chapter Party Committee member must be assigned to take charge of the governmental task and carry out operational procedures the same as those applied in areas bordering cities.

b. The mission of the above village committees is to intensify military and political attacks, frustrate the enemy's pacification and land encroachment plans, use our governmental authority to annihilate tyrants, break the enemy's oppressive control of the population, strengthen our force and expand our control over the area by gradually consolidating our installations toward the establishment of our local government.

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3. In areas bordering district seats, province capitals and cities:

- Various Party Committees of Tân Bình and Bình Chánh Districts and their village committees must suppress the enemy in the name of the Revolutionary Government. One or two members of these Party Committees must be assigned to take charge of the government task and get ready for activities and the establishment of District and Village Revolutionary Governments when the time of liberation comes.

- Following are our immediate tasks:

a. Annihilate wicked tyrants, break the enemy's oppressive control of the population, strengthen our forces, set up political organizations and create favorable conditions to gain firmer control over the area.

b. Struggle for social welfare, democracy and the protection of the people's daily interests.

B. Training of cadre:

Continue training courses for government cadre by developing studies, organizing regulations and working procedures at various levels of the government.

1. The Sub-Region should conduct training courses for all Current Affairs Committees in Đức Huệ, Đức Hòa, and Bến Thu Districts and all Party Committee members in charge of the governmental task in Tân Bình and Bình Chánh Districts. The Current Affairs Committee members of villages where our Revolutionary Governments have been set up should also attend these training courses.

2. Đức Huệ District Committee is responsible for the training of all hamlet committees.

3. The Sub-Region and District specialized branches such as the Security, Economy, Military, Information, Education, Civil Health, Social Welfare and War Invalid Branches should be responsible for training their own cadres on the governmental task, using their branch conferences and the village branch chiefs' and deputy chiefs' training courses.

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4. Supervision of cadre:

- The Sub-Region should supervise the village Current Affairs Committees.

- The assignment of government cadres [Current Affairs Committees] must be approved by the local Party Committees and higher echelon committees.

C. Intensification and consolidation of the Party leadership for the government:

- Our Party committees should assign their qualified members to take charge of the governmental task.

- A number of Party and Group members must be assigned to areas where the committee has been established.

- All village Party members should be trained to fully understand the role and the mission of the Party leadership in government so that they can positively motivate the people to join them in successfully carrying out all government tasks.

END

SOCIAL WELFARE FOR WAR INVALIDS 7. b/H

During the past year, the social activities for wounded soldiers attained a number of remarkable results:

- Although the number of wounded and sick soldiers increases day by day, various echelons and branches have overcome all difficulties and provided spiritual and physical care for these fighters as well as ensuring their messing, billeting, education and entertainment. Various important holidays such as "The Formation of the Indochinese Communist Party" on February 3rd; "The Formation of the Viet-Minh Front" on May 19; "The Independence Day" on September 2; "The Nam Bộ Resistance" on September 23, and "The Autumn Revolution" on August 19 have been celebrated solemnly. And especially this year we have celebrated the Memorial Day for wounded and dead soldiers. All these celebrations have made the wounded and sick soldiers clearly understand the Party's policy toward them.

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- In addition to taking care of our wounded and sick soldiers, Đức Huệ District has paid great attention to the movement supporting the war invalids, and the people in a number of areas have been also indoctrinated on the Party's wounded and dead soldiers policy. Our cadres have also been organized and assigned to take charge of the wounded soldiers task such as supporting and visiting families whose relatives had contributed to our revolution, thus exerting a good influence on the Party's wounded soldiers policy.

However, besides the above results there are still many shortcomings:

- The policy toward wounded soldiers, especially toward the families of wounded and dead soldiers and cadres, has not been implemented thoroughly in the three areas. The indoctrination on our wounded soldiers policy among the people, and the organization and assignment of cadres to take charge of the wounded soldiers' affairs have not been sufficient. Even the recommended commendation awards for families whose relatives had contributed to our revolution have been considered slowly, thus affecting the mobilization of manpower for the resistance.

- The organization of our administrative machinery is still poor.

- The number of high-level cadre is small and poor in professional skills.

The reason for the above shortcomings stems from various echelons not having thoroughly understood the task of wounded soldiers. On the other hand specialized cadres have not studied carefully their specialized branches to help the Party Committee echelons exercise leadership and provide prompt guidance for the movement.

FORTHCOMING TASKS

In developing our last year's achievements along with the destruction of the enemy's pacification program and the intensification of attacks against the enemy throughout the three areas, we must carry out the following tasks:

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- Organize deep indoctrination about our wounded and sick soldiers policy among our cadres and people so that they can understand completely this policy and carry it out successfully to mobilize manpower and material resources for the frontline.

- In regard to places where many wounded or sick soldiers are concentrated, in addition to taking care of their material life, we must pay attention to their spiritual life such as organizing cultural and political studies to increase their knowledge, abolish individualism and retain discipline.

- In regard to our wounded soldiers' families, we must offer regular care and prompt awards, carrying out successfully our policy concerning the treatment of wounded soldiers and the attention of our dead heroes' graves.

Organization:

- We must organize Wounded Soldiers' Social Welfare Sections down to village level. Our immediate task is to consolidate and replenish the district and village Wounded Soldiers' Social Welfare Sections. Each section needs 5 to 7 members.

- Districts having favorable conditions such as Đức Hòa, Bến Thu, Tân Bình, Bình Chánh must immediately organize these Social Welfare Sections with a number of three to five members in each, down to the village level. In other areas Party Committee members must be assigned to take care of social welfare for wounded soldiers at district and village levels.

10 February 1970

END

PROPOSED PUBLIC HEALTH TASKS 7 copies

With the leadership of the Party, since the beginning of the spring Mậu Thân Year [1968] until the present, our army and people in Sub-Region [2] have contributed their part to gain a great, overall and unprecedented victory. This has created a turning point in the history of our people's anti-American

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struggle for national salvation. This fact has exemplified the high determination and the great efforts of our entire Party and people in the sub-region, and especially the Civil Health Branch which has bravely fought the enemy and gained many great victories under fierce war conditions.

In the past two years, under the leadership of the Party Committee echelons, the Civil Health branch efficiently served our combat and production, and improved the living conditions of laborers in all areas, front and rear. It gained remarkable achievements and was granted 103 medals of various classes, many letters of appreciation and certificates of commendation for units and individuals by the Front [NLF]. However, in comparison with the requirements of the revolution at the present and forthcoming time, the Civil Health activities have not yet met the requirements of the branch (the public health system has not covered all villages and hamlets). In addition, prevalent deficiencies and shortcomings precluded the development of public health tasks. This was due to several reasons, but the main reason was that various district and village Party Committees did not place high consideration on public health and failed to realize the importance of this task which can provide efficient support to the present and forthcoming political missions of the Party.

In order to eliminate the above shortcomings, and to meet the requirements of the General Offensive and Uprising phase; to strengthen the movement against the enemy's present accelerated pacification program to gain a decisive victory; and to make preparations for the new phase, our public health tasks for the future will be as follows:

1. We should be determined to overcome all difficulties and exercise every effort to establish, consolidate and develop the public health system in all villages and hamlets, in border and rear areas, especially in the intermediate areas [areas between RVN and VC controlled areas] by adopting this guideline: "Use two forces, select one target, carry out one mission with two operating methods (covert and overt, but these methods must be separated to carry out one mission in one local area). Thus, we can stay close to one local area for the service of combat and production along with improving the laborers' living conditions.

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2. We must strive to intensify sanitation and preventative medical activities, and build a new way of life. In addition, we should pay attention to the protection of mothers and children, and the establishment of installations for treatment (public health stations, village maternity hospitals, district dispensaries, and sub-region hospitals). We must set up pharmaceutical production and selling installations [in all areas] from villages up to sub-region level. The main medicines are Oriental, Filatov [sic], and Subtilis [sic], etc... [sic]. In particular, the above missions should be carried out in areas under our control, with a view toward providing physical care for the people.

3. We should urgently train cadre, especially legal and illegal cadre, first-aid personnel, midwives, medics and assistant pharmacists (they should be trained in local areas and sent to the Sub-Region). At the same time, we should provide political indoctrination for them to improve their attitude toward the working class and their revolutionary ethics, heighten their sense of discipline and form their attitude of diligence and simplicity as well as motivating them to volunteer to work. Thus, we can increase the number of specialized public health cadre with sound political knowledge and a readiness to serve the Party under any circumstances.

The above are the three forthcoming basic public health tasks. The Civil Health Section of the sub-region will have a specific plan to provide guidance for various districts, according to the direct administrative channels.

SECURITY TASKS IN 1970

8/b/NP

I. SITUATION ANALYSIS:

A. Enemy situation:

Though having been defeated, obviously the US is still very obstinate and always uses cruel and wicked schemes to carry on the "accelerated pacification plan" which has been the "backbone" of the US "Vietnamization of the war plot".

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To carry out the above plan, during the last year, the enemy strove to strengthen his power in villages and hamlets by establishing police stations, and consolidating the local administrative machinery. The enemy is also planning to establish the Phường Hoàng [Phoenix] Committees in villages. He assigned a number of personnel from all military branches to his police forces and set up a secret network. Along with stepping up his psywar and "Chiêu Hồi" activities, and appealing to our personnel to surrender, he terrorized all members of the revolutionary families by detaining, torturing, and oppressing them. At the same time, he corrupted and lured our personnel into working for them as spies in our organizations. He also spread false news and encouraged his henchmen to engage in love affairs with the wives, sisters and daughters of our cadre and soldiers (he gave awards to those who succeeded in doing this) to reduce our revolutionary enthusiasm and create dissension among the people and our personnel, causing them to suspect one another. In addition, he bribed undesirable persons among the people and secretly organized them into an agent network to serve him in the present and future. At the same time, the special police force from the Police Directorate General has been sent to various districts to cooperate with the local administrative personnel to build a secret informant network, and plant personnel in our internal organizations and areas. They also coordinated with K [possibly Khmer, meaning Cambodia] intelligence forces to control the border areas, to block, intercept, and attack us. They tried to discover our plans, especially the days and time that we launch our campaigns, conduct movements, and concentrate our troops.

Because they are familiar with the terrain, the cruel tyrants in local areas have caused us a number of difficulties and losses, but in the face of the achievements of the revolution, and the successful results of our policy of suppressing cruel tyrants, they became confused and dared not stay in the villages and hamlets [at night]. In addition, because the individuals competed with each other the dissension between the enemy's higher and lower echelons, between security, intelligence, pacification agents, and the puppet troops becomes deeper and has considerably limited their activities.

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B. Our situation:

In the past period, we have made achievements in the security field. For example, we have succeeded in motivating the people to oppose enemy espionage and psywar activities, which has created suspicion among the people. We motivated them to break the enemy's oppressive control, and to suppress the cruel tyrants. All echelons have made progress in building our security machinery, but we still have the following shortcomings:

- We have not yet been determined to break the enemy's oppressive control of the population, eradicate enemy spies, or to suppress counter-revolutionaries. As for the enemy's overt elements, we have not yet succeeded in killing their key personnel and top leaders. Neither have we succeeded in detecting the enemy's underground elements and personnel.

- So far, the people's movement aimed at breaking up the enemy's oppressive control, annihilating wicked tyrants, and promoting security maintenance, has not been widespread.

- Our cadre, soldiers, Party members, association members, and people lacked caution and failed to observe security maintenance concerning the protection of the organization and the people.

- Our security machinery, especially our elements, were still weak. They did not closely coordinate with various associations, branches, or units, and did not correctly perform their missions as the center of the movement. They have not properly carried out their security missions in urban areas.

- Leadership tasks have been assigned to our Party Committee members, but in general these tasks have not been considered properly. There has been as a lack of concentrated leadership, especially our Party Committee members have not fully understood these two factors: the enemy's schemes and our security policy toward our organizations and toward the people.

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II. REQUIREMENTS OF OUR MISSION IN 1970.

We must strive to develop our achievements and be determined to overcome shortcomings, concentrating all efforts to motivate the people's uprising against the enemy's pacification plan and oppressive control of the population. We must also motivate the people to annihilate wicked tyrants and seize control suitable to the condition in areas (such as in cities, province capitals, district seats, weak areas etc...)

Through indoctrination, we must heighten the revolutionary vigilance and security maintenance concerns of the people, troops and agencies and closely control our personnel and the population in our hamlets. We also have to distinguish people who were bribed or forced to work for the enemy, and punish the reactionaries, eliminating enemy ringleaders and secret agents. We must be determined to track the enemy's public security agents and Chiêu Hồi cadres to annihilate them in their hideouts. At the same time, we must urgently develop our security force throughout all areas and prepare favorable conditions to control the situation, [establish] objectives so that we can work out a plan to ensure our immediate and future combat requirements.

In order to ensure the above requirements and missions, it is necessary for us to carry out the three following tasks successfully:

Three major tasks:

1. Village security activities:

At present our struggle to break the enemy's pacification plan, oppose the encroachment on our territory, and defeat his plan of Vietnamization of the war has evolved fiercely, especially in villages and hamlets. Therefore, the village security forces must play a key role in our struggle to break the enemy's pacification plans, hold our areas, win the people over to our side, and protect our agencies. In the future, when most of the people return to their farmlands and the puppet troops are disorganized, the relation between cities and rural

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areas will return to normal; when the tasks of breaking the enemy's oppressive control is completed and when protecting the Party installations and village Revolutionary Government, and transforming the enemy's last sanctuaries are accomplished we will have more difficult tasks.

The village security forces must not only be loyal but should also have adequate capability. They must improve their own professional skills to understand the situation and detect the enemy. They should also follow the Party's policy and guidelines to attack the enemy and meet the political requirements of the Party headquarters.

To set up effective village security machinery, we should recruit people living in local areas. The main force of the village security branch is the secret force, which consists of "secret agents, secret security personnel, secret armed reconnaissance personnel, and spies." Urgently develop a broad network of secret security personnel in villages and hamlets.

2. Security activities in cities:

Areas of emphasis: 6th Precinct; 3rd Tactical Zone; district seats; province capitals; and city bordering areas.

Purpose of security activities: Break the enemy's oppressive control over the population, annihilate tyrants, gain control over low level installations, build up our force and protect our agencies.

The important point in changing the balance of power and in gaining a stronger position is that we must strengthen the "secret force" in local areas. This force consists of secret agents, spies, secret armed reconnaissance agents, and secret security agents.

The secret force is the main force of the security branch. So, we should pressingly develop it everywhere. In the recruitment of local area personnel for this force, we should choose "legal" people because they can operate there for a long time. They can also achieve their tasks easily, and meet our present and future requirements.

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- Espionage is the special service of the security branch. We should make an effort to develop our agent network in enemy areas. Various security echelons are responsible for recruiting agents when needed, and assigning appropriate missions to them according to their capability.

The espionage task is the important one in the present as well as in the future, but it is very complex. We should carry out this task in accordance with the Party's policy guidelines, principles and system. We should also closely control the implementation of this task with the purpose of collecting and reporting to higher echelons and local units exact information on the plans and organization of the enemy, and on our security maintenance, so we can protect the Party and the revolutionary government, and expand our control and protection of our bases in border areas.

Breaking the enemy's oppressive control and killing tyrants:

- Breaking the enemy's oppressive control and killing the tyrants in cities, province capitals, district seats and city bordering areas, are the missions of the armed reconnaissance, military, political, and military proselyting forces, especially the local secret force, in annihilating the enemy tyrants and ringleaders who directly destroy our movements.

- The targets to be destroyed are the US and puppet intelligence espionage force and public security agencies in cities, district seats, and province capitals. Along with the security task, we have to break the enemy's oppressive control by promoting armed and political struggles.

Security sections of all levels and "security sections in district seats and province capitals" must directly take charge of this task. Each level is responsible for its own objectives.

3. Protecting our internal organizations, especially the Party.

The task of protecting our internal organizations is designed especially to prevent the enemy from planting his agents in our ranks.

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In order to destroy us, the US imperialists will first of all attack our Party's organizations. Therefore, the most important problem of the security task is to protect the Party.

Protecting the Party is the common task of the entire Party, but security agents still have to do their best to do this task.

First, they must heighten their revolutionary awareness and distinguish friends from foes, in accordance with the Party's policy, which is both to attack and appeal to the enemy. Attack counter-revolutionaries, and ideologically reform those who are lured to the enemy due to their optimism.

Second, they must adopt an appropriate attitude toward comrades who were captured and have been released by the enemy.

The fighting in SVN is very fierce. Many of our cadre and Party members were captured by the enemy. Most of our comrades who were captured by the enemy were good, but it is still possible that a number of them have changed their thinking due to the enemy's oppression.

Therefore, the security sections must cooperate with the organization sections to investigate the comrades who were released by the enemy, survey their ideology and then report, and make any recommendations to the committee echelons for any appropriate actions.

Third, the security sections take precautions against the fact that the enemy takes advantage of our recruitment of personnel to plant his agents in our ranks. Therefore, while recruiting persons in the local areas, they must strictly execute the principles of personnel recruitment as well as management of cadre and Party members.

The maintenance of secret documents must be closely observed.

Organization: Various echelons and branches, military as well as civilian, must all have internal security protection elements.

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All echelons must select their targets for attacks and they must employ their personnel in these attacks against the enemy. However, they must also exploit to the utmost their branches' capability to ensure continuing activities.

In suppressing enemy tyrants, we must distinguish real reactionaries from those who were bribed or forced by the enemy to work for him. We will punish real reactionaries and indoctrinate bribed tyrants.

We must attack the enemy's covert elements and ringleaders. At the same time, we must be determined to attack the public security agents and Chiêu Hồi personnel, even in their sanctuaries.

4. Urgently strengthen our forces, and perfect security machinery of all echelons:

Secret forces, including secret security agents, secret armed reconnaissance and intelligence personnel, are the main forces of the security section. Therefore, various echelons must develop a secret force for themselves. The lower echelons must provide men for higher echelons.

In accordance with the guidelines, the development of force must be carried out on a wide scale and we must be sure that all recruited personnel are capable.

- We must pay special attention to the strengthening of the security machinery in villages, hamlets, quarters and wards. We must also consolidate all sections of the sub-region and districts, especially the district sections, because the districts are the direct command echelons for the villages.

Concurrently, we must reorganize the professional branches of the districts and sub-regions, and motivate all branches to make efforts to develop their capability.

III. A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS CONCERNING LEADERSHIP.

In this reorientation session, various echelons, branches, and even the Party Chapters and Party members must fully understand the requirement of the security task, and be

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determined to overcome all ideas of rightism. We must mobilize our forces, especially the people's force, to annihilate wicked personnel, break the enemy's oppressive control of the population, and suppress the enemy's spies in accordance with the security policy of the Party.

- The provinces and districts must have their own leadership and specific plan, and assign tasks to capable comrades who will cling to the areas and guide our activities.

- The relationship between the lower and higher echelons must be consolidated. Lower echelons must request instructions monthly from the higher echelons, and submit their reports on combat activities with their comments, evaluation of the situation, and proposals. These reports must be sent to the Party Committees and all echelons through the technical chain of command.

FINANCE AND ECONOMY MISSION IN 1970

7.b/H

In Battlefield TI, the enemy carried out his pacification plan, and launched fierce attacks throughout our areas. These attacks caused difficulties to our financial-economic task; however, we have attained a number of achievements in production, protection of crops, and in financial collection.

In the face of his financial and economic collapse, the enemy has looted our people's property in various ways. He increased taxes and robbed the people while conducting demagogic propaganda to gain public opinion. In addition, the enemy blockaded our base areas, and purchased all main food provisions produced in our controlled areas, which were to be sold to cities to undermine our economy.

In the finance and economy field, though we have gained a number of achievements, we have failed to launch continuous attacks against the enemy and to carry out the self-sufficiency program during the General Offensive and Uprising phase. We have not yet paid attention to increasing production and motivating the people in the bordering and intermediate areas to migrate to white [cleared, uninhabited] areas to produce [food]. Neither have we provided leadership for financial collection to ensure

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self-sufficiency in local areas. Furthermore, we did not coordinate the financial and economic task with other types of struggle so as to consolidate the intermediate areas, creating a solid position for our troops. We have not succeeded in transforming our base areas into strong economic and political rear areas of TI. In addition, we failed to mobilize our manpower and increase the establishment of our installations in local areas with a view toward intensifying the rear service activities there. We still relied on support from other areas. The management of finance remains poor, while waste and corruption are prevalent.

In order to meet the important material requirements of the immediate political and military mission and to establish installations for future development we should intensify the finance and economy activities in TI, in accordance with the following direction and mission:

Closely coordinate with political and military activities, motivate the entire Party and people in TI to both attack the enemy and maintain the agricultural production level in the bordering areas, develop agricultural production in intermediate areas, and base areas, and protect crops. We should expand the transportation line, and mobilize material and manpower resources to meet the requirements of the Revolution. We should also consolidate the finance and economy task in rural areas, and counter the economic blockade set up by the enemy in our base areas. We should recruit more agents to defeat the enemy in the financial and economic fields of the future phase.

In execution of the above mission, we should strive to implement the following specific tasks:

1. We should make efforts to step up agricultural production, protect crops, and especially increase food provisions. At the same time, we should motivate the people to participate in the economy movement.

Under any circumstances, in the bordering, intermediate, and base areas, we should intensify agricultural production and protection of crops with a view toward increasing food provisions for use in ordinary and combat conditions.

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- In bordering and intermediate areas, motivate the people to conduct three-pronged attacks [possibly military, political, and economic], to frustrate the enemy's pacification plan, hold the land, increase agricultural production and seize control of the area. We should denounce political oppression and the economic exploitation by the enemy. We should also motivate the people to migrate to the white areas for the development of our forces.

- In our base areas, we should increase agricultural production to have enough food to provide for the people and the resistance, and consolidate the rear areas of TI.

- In all liberated agricultural areas, we should provide guidances for the farmers to practice cultivation of additional crops, and increase [animal] husbandry activities, so as to have enough food and enough animals for pulling [carts].

- All civilian, Party, and military agencies in our base areas should practice the self-sufficiency policy in producing rice enough for four months' use. The main policy is to increase agricultural products to have more food provisions.

We should closely coordinate forces to conduct three-pronged attacks, protect farm products, prevent the enemy from sabotaging and looting them, and make plans to struggle against natural disasters.

Handicraft and family small trades should be encouraged to develop self-sufficiency for some consumers' goods and increase the people's income.

We should broadly initiate an economy movement among cadre, soldiers, and people, and counter reliance on others. This political motivation conducted together with the review of past activities by various Party caucuses on "Four-Excellences Party Chapters," is an attempt to restrict waste and corruption.

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2. Adopt the policy of motivating the people to contribute financially. Improve our management of receipts and expenditures under collective leadership, in order to provide enough finances for the frontline. At the same time, we must improve discipline in the management of finances.

During fighting, we should increase agricultural production, strengthen the people's manpower, indoctrinate personnel on patriotism, and motivate all classes of people to contribute their manpower and material resources to the Resistance; this is aimed at increasing local self-support. We should also economize aid from other areas to ensure the requirements of the Revolution and establish a reserve fund. In coordination with the conference on agricultural production in 1970, make a recapitulative report on the collection of finances.

The budget situation in 1970 is very tense due to the devaluation of the SVN currency and the difficulties caused by the enemy. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the receipts, reduce the expenditures, and carry out the program of production for self-sufficiency. Practice thriftiness, and counter waste and corruption.

The financial collection in TI is collected chiefly through the limited fund drives which were carried out according to the following criteria:

Đức Hòa:	29 million \$VN
Đức Huệ:	6 million \$VN
Bến Thu:	22 million \$VN
Bình Chánh:	6 million \$VN
Tân Bình:	6 million \$VN
6th District,	1 million \$VN
3 Tactical Zone:	

Concentrate cadre of various branches and troops to carry out the collection task right after harvest time and in the first months of the year. Finance and economy sections should assign cadre to districts and villages to step up the activities of collection, and consolidate the finance and economy machinery. Party Chapters should check the contributions of

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Party members and recommend prompt awards for individuals and units that have carried out successful contribution missions.

The management of expenditures must be carried out correctly, in compliance with criteria and be put under the collective leadership of the authorized financial agency. Enhance discipline in the management of finances, oppose the reliance on the aids given by other areas, and increase the administration of financial affairs in various agencies and units, especially in places where the receipts and expenditures are abundant. Strictly carry out the regulations concerning accounts and funds, economize the budget, and oppose corruption and waste.

The organization and finance-economy sections should coordinate with each other to make plans for the reorganization of the civilian administrative and Party agencies; the Military Affairs Party Committees should take charge of the reorganization of military affairs in order to closely control finances.

3. Development and consolidation of the finance and economy machinery from TI through HN [sic], to villages for ensuring the accomplishment of tasks and properly applying the Party's guideline in the three areas.

Strengthen and consolidate the finance and economy machinery of the province, district, and village level, so that they are capable of performing their tasks. In bordering and intermediate areas, organize the financial force into overt and covert elements. The covert elements must have adequate strength to hold on to the local areas. In TI, we should recruit a number of covert finance and economy cadre to operate on the battlefield. Each finance and economy level from TI to village must assign a Party Committee member to take charge of providing the leadership for this task, and be responsible to the Party Committee echelon.

Finance and economy sections are to train cadre specializing in finance, economy, accounting, and financial affairs for TI, HN, and village echelons. At the same time, they should closely control the number of finance-economy cadre operating in TI.

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The working procedure for the finance and economy sections at all levels is to hold a meeting every month to review all tasks, make out plans for the new tasks, then report to the higher echelons.

4. Increase the leadership of the Party Committee echelons over the finance and economy tasks:

- All Party Committee echelons, cadre, and Party members must thoroughly understand the importance of the financial and economic field, the policy and the main points of this task. The Party Committee echelons must have regular reports on finance and economy; then provide specific leadership.

- Along with the development of responsibility and the capability of the Revolutionary Government, develop the leadership of the Party Committee echelons in the finance and economy task. At the same time, we should motivate our armed forces and the people's revolutionary group to carry out the finance and economy tasks.

- Organize the machinery to study and inspect activities in all fields: Agriculture, industry, trade, communication, transportation, and currency...for restoring and developing our finance and economy in the future.

END